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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court 
are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the district court correctly rule, based upon the 
undisputed facts, that the termination of plaintiff's employment 
with the County as part of a mandatory reduction in force was in 
compliance with the applicable provisions of the governing personnel 
manual? The district court's interpretation of the terms of the 
manual is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for correctness by 
this Court. L.D..S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P. 2d 
857 (Utah 1988). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no statutes, rules or regulations pertinent to this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the First 
Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah. 
1 
Statement of Facts 
The following facts were assumed and undisputed before the 
district court: 
This is a breach of contract action in which appellant, Archie 
Thurston, alleges he was terminated in violation of the terms of an 
employee manual which governed his employment. R.19. During all 
times material to this action, Thurston was employed by the 
respondent, Box Elder County, as an employee within the County Road 
Department. Thurston, a former road supervisor, held the position 
of foreman at the time of his termination. R.20. 
During November and December 1988, the Box Elder County 
Commission ordered certain county departments and agencies to 
initiate an employee reduction in force ("RIF"). County Road 
Superintendent John Collom was ordered to lay off three employees 
from the County Road Department. R.20, 36. On December 16, 1988, 
Thurston was involuntarily terminated from his employment with Box 
Elder County pursuant to the County Commission reduction in-work-
force orders directed toward the county's road department. R.20. 
The position held by Thurston, lead worker or foreman, was 
permanently eliminated as part of the reduction in force. The 
duties formerly performed by the foreman were taken over by the road 
supervisor, in addition to his other responsibilities. R.20-21. 
2 
In April 1988, approximately six months prior to Thurston's 
layoff, Box Elder County published and maintained a personnel policy 
and procedures manual captioned "Box Elder County Policy and 
Procedures Manual." The Manual set forth personnel policies, rules 
and standards governing employee reduction in work force 
circumstances, categories of rule infractions subject to employee 
disciplinary action and an administrative grievance procedure for 
the adjustment of employee grievances. R.20. Paragraph 11(F) of 
the Manual provides in material part: 
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack of 
work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, the 
Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off the 
necessary number of employees with consideration to the 
length of service and/or individual performance. 
R.21. The parties agree that the above provision governed the 
termination of Thurston in response to the County Commission's 
reduction-in-force mandate. R.22, 51-52. 
At the time of Thurston's December 16, 1988, involuntary 
termination from employment pursuant to reduction in work force 
procedures, the county's road department employed approximately 2 8 
employees, approximately 20 of whom had less seniority than 
Thurston. R.21. 
In determining which employees should be laid off under the 
reduction in force, Road Supervisor John Collom took into account 
several factors, including issues of seniority and individual 
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performance. Collom first considered laying off the employees with 
the least amount of seniority, which would have been the truck 
drivers. However, Collom felt the department could not be run 
properly without the truck drivers. Collom also felt it would be 
too disruptive to lay off the truck drivers and then fill those 
positions with higher-level personnel, whose own positions would 
then have to be filled by higher-level personnel, etc. Collom then 
utilized a weighing process, considering which employees would best 
serve the county if retained. R.37-38. 
After engaging in a weighing process, Collom determined that 
Thurston was an appropriate person to lay off. Collom felt that 
Thurston did not have a good work attitude, which was reflected in 
Thurston's job performance and dealings with Collom. An additional 
factor supporting Collomfs decision was that Thurston had previously 
stated that he had a job waiting if he were ever laid off. R.37-
38. The other two road department employees laid off were a 
landfill worker who had been hired a short time before the RIF, and 
another employee whose performance had deteriorated. R.38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Thurston was laid off from the County Road Department as part 
of an undisputed, legitimate reduction in force. Assuming that 
Thurston's employment status was not terminable at will, the sole 
issue raised is whether the County complied with the applicable 
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reduction-in-force provision of its personnel manual in terminating 
Thurston's employment. 
The applicable provision in the Manual states that layoffs due 
to a reduction in force shall be made "with consideration to length 
of service and/or individual performance." The unrefuted evidence 
establishes that the road superintendent considered both seniority 
and individual performance in making his decision. The fact that 
the superintendent also considered other factors in reaching his 
decision is not contrary to the Manual's terms. Ordinary usage of 
the word "consider" permits the County to weigh additional factors, 
as long as at least one of the two named factors was considered. 
The superintendent's consideration of four instances of 
deficient work performance for which Thurston was not formally 
disciplined was also proper. Because the superintendent considered 
Thurston's work performance in determining whom to lay off, Thurston 
seeks to force the County to incorporate the Manual's disciplinary 
procedures into the RIF provision. That argument was expressly 
rejected in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc. , 777 P. 2d 483 
(Utah 1989) , wherein this court held that an employer may rely upon 
applicable RIF provisions when laying off an employee under a 
legitimate RIF, even if the employer may have other reasons for 
terminating the employee. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Under Utah law, Thurston's employment with the County is 
presumed to have been terminable at will. Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd. , 771 P. 2d 1033 (Utah 1989). For purposes of its motion for 
summary judgment only, however, the County assumed that Thurston had 
a protected interest in his employment, and that the terms of the 
Box Elder County Policies and Procedures Manual ("the Manual") 
governed his termination. Consequently, the only issue to be 
decided is whether Thurston's termination was in compliance with the 
Manual. 
It is undisputed that Section 11(F) of the Manual sets forth 
the applicable guidelines concerning reduction-in-force: 
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack of 
work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, the 
Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off the 
necessary number of employees with consideration to the 
length of service and/or individual performance. 
On appeal, Thurston contends that his termination was contrary 
to the provisions of the Manual, arguing: (1) In selecting 
employees to be laid off pursuant to the RIF, the County could not 
consider any factors other than "length of service and/or individual 
performance," and (2) the County's consideration of "individual 
performance" was restricted to review of Thurston's disciplinary 
file. 
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U.S. 842 (1984) (requirement that Parole Board "consider" a 
prisoner's record did not make that factor determinative; Board 
could deny parole regardless of prisoner's record); United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. v. Industrial Commission, 363 S.W.2d 
82, 90 (Mo.App. 1962) (statutory requirement that Commission 
"consider" rates fixed by bargaining agreement did not require 
Commission to follow or adopt those rates). 
In this respect, Thurston concedes that Stewart v. Chevron 
Chemical Co., 762 P.2d 1143 (Wash. 1988, en banc), is particularly 
instructive. In Stewart, the plaintiff was laid off by Chevron as 
part of a reduction in force. An employee manual provided that 
"[i]n determining the sequence of layoffs due to lack of work, 
consideration should be given to performance, experience and length 
of service." Id. at 1144. Although the plaintiff was the most 
senior employee, he was selected to be laid off, primarily because 
of past poor performance. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful 
discharge, arguing that Chevron was required to consider all three 
of the elements mentioned in the manual provision, including 
seniority. The Washington Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. Initially, the court noted that the 
word "should" is discretionary, rather than mandatory. As an 
alternative ground, the court then analyzed the effect of the 
"consideration" requirement: 
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Furthermore, Chevron was only required to "consider" 
these factors; no relative weight or value is assigned 
to any of the cri teria. Thus, even if Chevron had 
factored Stewart's length of service into its decision, 
it was not required to give that criterion more weight 
than performance, or any weight whatsoever if management 
deemed it inadvisable to do so. Thus the wording of § 
380 does not set forth the specificity necessary to 
create a binding promise, . , . The layoff policy was 
not a definite promise or commitment that Chevron would 
give more weight to seniority, as Stewart appears to 
argue, but was merely a guideline for management. 
Id c !:  1 II 16 (emphasi s added) . 
>. ommc sense a > so compels the conclusion that the County was 
entitled *; weigh a) relevant factors in making its Rl* iecision, 
r 
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the disadvantages as well. 
Under the common and ordinary sense of the word consider, 
therefore, it was permissible for the County to consider all factors 
relevant to a determination of which employees should be laid off 
under the RIF. Those factors included not only seniority and/or 
individual performance, but also which employees1 duties might be 
absorbed into other departments, and the availability of other 
employment to the affected employeese 
Governmental bodies should be given latitude in making 
decisions necessary to accommodate budgetary constraints and to cut 
costs. It is difficult to comprehend Thurstonfs contention that the 
County should be penalized for concluding that, of employees who 
might be terminated, it should lay off one who said he had a 
position waiting rather than send another out into the community in 
search of a job. The decision seems even more appropriate when the 
first employee has not performed well for the County. 
The same common sense approach compels the rejection of 
Thurston's argument that an RIF does not permit the elimination of 
a position within a department, but only allows for termination of 
individual employees. Not surprisingly, Thurston cites no authority 
for the novel proposition that a county is required to maintain an 
unneeded position even when it has been ordered to cut the payroll. 
If anything, Supervisor Collom should be commended for identifying 
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Supervisor .
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consideration of the four examples in question affected the County's 
decision. In any event, however, Thurston's position is 
insupportable. 
Thurston's contention hinges on an assumption that section 
11(F) of the Manual, the RIF provision, restricted Collom's 
evaluation to an examination of Thurston's disciplinary file. That 
assumption is not supported by the language of section 11(F), 
however, which provides only that RIF layoffs are to be made with 
consideration to seniority and/or "individual performance." The RIF 
clause does not refer to any other section of the Manual, such as 
that governing disciplinary actions. 
The RIF provision is located within a separate section of the 
Manual, Section II, governing Employee Status Classification. The 
disciplinary procedures which Thurston wishes to incorporate into 
the RIF provision are found in Section V of the Manual, which 
addresses Disciplinary Action - Categories of Rules Infractions. 
The various categories of infractions discussed in Thurston's brief 
come into play only when disciplinary action is being taken. 
Thurston's employment was terminated not as any kind of disciplinary 
action, but as the result of a reduction in force. 
This Court's recent decision in Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & 
Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) addressed precisely this 
situation. In Caldwell, the plaintiff was laid off as part of an 
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should have been handled under a different manual provision Ahich 
governed term:i nat i ::)i 1 s " •' • 
judgment for the defendant, it? 3eating tin-' pi^incir1 •- theory: 
His argument is, ... jssence, that even when FB&; is 
involuntarily terminating employees as part oi a 
reduction in force, if it individually evaluates 
candidates for discharge and picks and chooses among 
them rather than using some arbitrary mechanism for 
determining who is discharged, such as a "last in, first 
out" rule, it is, in fact, discharging those selected 
for termination "for cause11 and must follow the 
procedures set out in bulletin No. 902. There is no 
merit to this contention. The language of the manual 
does not require such a result. It plainly contemplates 
that involuntary terminations other than those for cause 
may be made by FB&D and does not limit the reasons for 
which the employer may make them, and it certainly does 
not require that reductions in force be based on some 
arbitrary criteria. 
. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether FB&D was, in fact, conducting a reduction in 
force or whether Caldwell was terminated as part of that 
program. That being the case, FB&D would have been 
entitled to rely on paragraph 6(a) of "Operations 
Bulletin No. 202" in effecting his termination. 
Id. c t 186 (eiivphas,1 s added ) . 
xJ 
The circumstances in this case are substantially the same. 
The Box Elder County Policies and Procedures Manual contains one 
provision which governs reduction in force, and a separate provision 
which governs disciplinary matters. Thurston does not dispute that 
layoffs were necessitated by a legitimate reduction in force. As 
indicated in Caldwell, any additional reasons the County might have 
for terminating Thurston are immaterial; compliance with the RIF 
provision relieves the County from liability. For the same reason, 
Thurston's allegation that Collom failed to inform him initially of 
the reasons for his selection are immaterial. 
Thurston's contention that the holding in Caldwell turned on 
Caldwell's alleged at-will status is refuted by the language of the 
decision itself. Although the defendant in Caldwell argued that the 
plaintiff's employment was at will, its alternative argument, upon 
which this Court based its decision, was that "even if the policy 
Manual modified the at-will character of the employment relationship 
by requiring FB&D to comply with its terms in discharging employees, 
Caldwell was nevertheless legitimately terminated involuntarily as 
a result of a reduction in force and his termination was handled 
properly under Bulletin No. 202." Xd. at 484. Caldwell is thus 
directly on point, and instructs that as long as the applicable RIF 
provision is satisfied, the fact that an employer may have 
additional reasons for wishing to terminate an employee is 
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immaterial. 
Significantly, Thurston states that lf[t]he County's argument 
is provisionally correct for those circumstances where the 
individual performance credentials of two or more employees subject 
to separation under a RIF action are being compared and the covered 
conduct of each employee has not been subject to the disciplinary 
action provisions of the Manual. Thurston's individual performance, 
however, was never compared by Collom with that of any other County 
Road Department employee." (Brief of Appellant, p. 20.) Thurstonfs 
argument overlooks the obvious fact that any assessment of one 
employee's performance inherently involves a comparison with other 
employees. Moreover, by his argument, Thurston seeks to rewrite the 
Manual to require a specific comparison system in the event of an 
RIF. As the district court observed, 
The Court is of the opinion that the discipline 
procedures of the Personnel Policy and the reduction in 
force considerations are separate and distinct and hcive 
no relationship to each other and is not persuaded that 
any performance matter to be considered in a reduction 
in force setting must preliminarily have been considered 
in a disciplinary setting. The Court also notes that 
while it might have been advisable to consider any 
performance of the Plaintiff in this case in a 
relationship to other employee's, the Court finds that 
there is no legal precedent which mandates such a 
procedure and accordingly finds that the county is not 
obligated to do so. 
The unrefuted evidence established that the decision to lay 
off Thurston under the RIF was made after careful consideration of 
15 
seniority and individual performance. The presence of other factors 
more compelling than seniority made Thurston a logical choice for 
termination. Thurstonfs termination was in full compliance with the 
provisions of Section 11(F). Under Caldwell, therefore, Thurston's 
claims fail as a matter of law, and the summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent Box Elder County 
respectfully requests that the summary judgment entered by the 
district court be affirmed. 
DATED this day of December, 199 0. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Dale J. I^mbert 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
MEMORANDUM DECISION A-l 
ORDER A-5 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE W. THURSTON, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 890000166 
This matter came before the Court on Counter Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The Court having read the motions, supporting 
documents and affidavits and counter pleadings of the parties and 
having heard oral arguments now issues the following Memorandum 
Decision: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The issue presented before the Court is whether the 
procedures followed by the County in a reduction in force issue were 
appropriate as applied to this Plaintiff. It being conceded by the 
parties that there was a reduction in force not only of the 
Plaintiff in this action but, other individuals as well. 
It is agreed by both parties that the relevant provision 
involved in this action is contained in the Box Elder County's 
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual adopted April 26, 1988 and 
specifically # II F Reduction in Workforce . The revelant language 
is quoted in this opinion in total as follows: "When circumstances 
(such as lack of funds or lack of work) indicate that a reduction in 
force is needed, the Elected Official or Department Head shall lay 
off the necessary number of employees with consideration to length 
of service and/or individual performance. 
A-l 
Civil No. 890000166 
Page 2 
This case hinges on the definition of the word 
"consideration1' and the effect to be given thereto and its 
application in this fact situation. 
The Court is of the opinion that the discipline proceduresof 
the Personnel Policy and the reduction in force considerations are 
separate and distinct and have no relationship to each other and is 
not persuaded that any performance matter to be considered in a 
reduction in force setting must preliminarily have been considered 
in a disciplinary setting. The Court also notes that while it might 
have been advisable to consider any performance of the Plaintiff in 
this case in a relationship to other employee1s, the Court finds 
that there is no legal precedent which mandates such a procedure and 
accordingly finds that the county is not obligated to do so. 
As to the interpretation of the word "consider", both parties 
have referred to the Chevron case in their briefs and the language 
of the Court therein. In the opinion of the Court, the critical 
language in that case is that the provisions of referring to 
consideration of these factors were given "merely as a guideline for 
management". It is also unrealistic in the view of the Court to 
assume that if the Courts can indicate as they did in the Chevron 
case, that no relative weight or value is assigned to any of the 
criteria including the fact that "they may not give any weight 
whatsoever if management deemed it inadvisable to do so", that 
thereby the County would be procluded from considering any other 
factors. In the view of the Court even though there may be some 
equitable reasons for weighting factors differently than the County 
may have done in this case, the status of the law is that in 
reduction in force provisions such as the one before the Court the 
employer is only required to consider and give such weight as they 
determine appropriate to the factors enumerated and that they are 
not precluded from considering other factors in addition to those 
enumerated The uncontroverted 
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affidavits of the County indicate that in fact the criteria were 
both considered, that there was concern expressed to the employee 
concerning his individual performance and that in addition to these 
factors, other factors were considered such as the opportunity for 
the employees to obtain outside employment if in fact due to the 
reduction in force he was terminated. 
Accordingly, for the reasons contained herein, the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted, there being no 
genuine issue of a material fact remaining and the Trial Setting in 
this matter is vacated. 
Counsel for Defendant to prepare an order for the Court 
consistant with this opinion and submit the same to Counsel for 
Plaintiff for approval as to form. 
•4 DATED this _ day of December, 1989 
AU. 
F.L. GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Mr 
00024m 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE W. THURSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 89 0000 166 
The Court having heard the oral arguments of counsel 
representing the plaintiff and the defendant, the motions, 
supporting documents, affidavits and other pleadings on file herein 
and good cause appearing therefor: 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied; 
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Consistent with this Order, plaintiff's Complaint is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. ' 
DATED this /[fin day of Daeember, *9Q9~. 
BY THE COURT: 
Philip c. Ratterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By:. \L u. 
District Court Judge 
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